The Death of Japan’s Master Politician Leaves a Void

Abe Shinzo was young – just 67 – 11 years younger than US President Joe Biden when he took office. The Japanese politician was showing no sign of retreating to a post-prime-ministerial life of quiet leisure, common among American presidents after they step down. Instead, after resigning in 2020, he played an active role in shaping the outcome of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership race last September and commented regularly on the challenges Japan faces in the world. Abe remained committed to his goal of constitutional revision and no doubt would have been heavily involved in the discussions about whether to launch formally a revision process this fall after another strong showing by the LDP in upper house elections on July 10, just two days after he was killed.

His passing, at the hands of an assassin with personal grievances, inevitably leads us to wonder how the premature departure of such an influential figure might alter the course of history. Such speculation must start with a clear-eyed review of what Abe did and did not accomplish over two terms as prime minister (2006-07 and 2012-20). So I will start there – and will then consider what political forces will step into the political vacuum he leaves behind, what goals they will prioritize, and how likely they are to be successful in achieving them.

Abe first rose to a position of influence in Japanese politics in the years immediately after 9/11, under Koizumi Jun’ichiro, prime minister from 2001 to 2006. His roles in the cabinet office put him in the middle of discussions about how Japan should respond to the terrorist attacks, the War on Terror declared by the United States, and the Iraq War that followed. This experience dealing with serious security challenges reinforced his conviction that Japan badly needed to break out of the constitutional limitations on its ability to defend itself and its allies – something that he campaigned on from the start of his career. His long commitment to constitutional revision grew out of respect for his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, who sought a similar policy change in the 1950s. Abe wanted to achieve what his grandfather had failed to accomplish and thereby return Japan to a position where it could be the active architect of its future.

Abe had his first opportunity to move Japan in this direction when he succeeded Koizumi as prime minister in 2006. One of his first acts was to push through legislation elevating the Defense Agency to ministerial status. The new Ministry of Defense would not need to rely on staff seconded from the Ministry of Finance (which was always worried about over-spending) and would be able to sponsor its own legislation. He also pushed through laws that established for the first time a detailed process for conducting the referenda required to endorse any constitutional amendment that might be passed by a two-thirds vote of the Diet, or parliament. While these changes were probably necessary, Japanese voters viewed Abe’s almost exclusive focus on these issues as a dereliction of the prime minister’s duty to concentrate first on matters close to home, like pensions.

Abe learned from this error in his second, much longer term as prime minister, when he succeeded a series of three short-term prime ministers from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ had pushed through a consumption tax increase that plunged the Japanese economy back into deflation, had poorly managed the response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and had been unable to handle a more assertive China, which was sending flotillas of fishing boats and coast guard vessels into the waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Given the prominence of the China threat when he returned to power, a younger Abe would no doubt have plowed ahead with an attempt to revise the constitution, but this time Abe led with the economic strategy known as Abenomics, which aimed “three arrows” at the target of ending deflation and restoring Japan to robust growth. The monetary policy put in place by Abe’s hand-picked Bank of Japan governor, Kuroda Haruhiko, was indeed aggressive, and the prime minister was able to give a boost to the economy using monetary stimulus and fiscal spending on earthquake recovery.

This focus on the economy helped deliver Abe a solid upper house election victory in the summer of 2013, giving him three “golden years” in which he did not need to face the voters. The message discipline that his government practiced was made possible, in part, by Abe’s patient efforts to build out his leadership team to help him push forward his other policy priorities and handle any crisis that might suddenly arise. He chose experienced figures such as Yachi Shotaro to handle foreign affairs in the cabinet office, put together a new National Security Council, developed the ability to choose senior bureaucrats through a centralized personnel office, and relied on the able Suga Yoshihide (who would succeed him in 2020) to be the day-to-day face of the administration in dealing with the press.

When we look back on Abe’s legacy, this successful management of prime ministerial leadership that enabled him to stay in office for eight years when the previous six leaders (including himself) had each lasted only about one year has to be high up on the list of his major achievements. It has already influenced how Kishida Fumio, the current prime minister, is managing his government.

With this focus on the economy and with key personnel in place, Abe then pivoted back to security affairs. Having placed an ally in the top position at the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and like-minded experts on an advisory body, Abe announced in July 2014 that the cabinet was henceforth reinterpreting Article 9 of the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Whereas before it could only maintain the military capacity necessary to defend itself, it could now plan to assist an ally in a situation where its failure to do so would leave the nation’s existence in jeopardy. This change would enable Japan to begin planning to work even more closely with the United States military than before to prepare for contingencies in the immediate region and beyond.

This cabinet decision and the implementing legislation and foreign policy reorientation that followed are no doubt the most important policy changes implemented during Abe’s years in office. How we evaluate his legacy and what he might have accomplished had he lived depends on what he did and did not get done by making these modifications.

It is important to note that he did not manage to revise the constitution, which was his goal. In fact, by pursuing this work-around, he took the air out of the pressure that was building for a constitutional revision to accomplish the same purpose. From that point on, while Abe continued to advocate for a change in Article 9 that would recognize explicitly that the existence of the Self-Defense Forces was constitutional, he stopped pushing so insistently since that change would be symbolic. He just needed to wait for the right moment.

The reinterpretation, nevertheless, allowed Abe to focus more on Japan’s foreign policy strategy in the region. The rise of China, North Korea’s nuclear program, and (after 2016) the unpredictability of the United States under Donald Trump, all called for a reorientation of Japanese policy away from an exclusive reliance on the United States as an alliance partner. Trump, by threatening to pull US military forces out of Japan if Tokyo did not pay its way and by actually withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, demonstrated to the Japanese and others in the region that they needed to develop a regional strategy for dealing with a more assertive China. The concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) was Abe’s answer to this challenge.

What does the premature departure of Abe mean for the future of Japan? One thing that is not happening is an over-reaction to the assassination, as happened in the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. No one is using this event to insist on faster movement in the direction Abe tried to take the country. But the LDP election victory has given Prime Minister Kishida the opportunity to move boldly if he wishes.

Those deadlines in December afford him few months to lay out exactly how Japan plans to equip its military forces to support a multilateral FOIP strategy for dealing with the growing risks of North Korean nuclear blackmail or a Chinese attempt to take control of Taiwan. His government could call for the building a counterstrike capability so that, in the event of Chinese or North Korean aggression, Japan would be able to deter a missile attack by demonstrating that it had the capacity to retaliate without simply relying on the US to be its shield and spear.

At the same time or after December, Kishida could also pursue an amendment that would establish the constitutional grounding of the SDF, possibly packaged with other changes in areas such as marriage rights that might make the set of amendments more palatable to the parties and voters who would be needed to push it through.

Meanwhile, the prime minister could also shift into a higher gear in his promotion of economic reform. Abe’s structural reform “arrow” left much still to be done if Japan is to grow consistently in the face of a shrinking workforce. Kishida has announced he will flesh out his “new capitalism” agenda with a detailed plan expected this fall, which might include greater support for start-ups, labor market reforms, and/or plans to ensure that these measures benefit all segments of society and not just the urban elite.

If Abe had lived, he would have pushed Kishida to do most of these things, at least on the security side. The PM now no longer needs to worry about Abe operating levers of influence within the party to push him along. He is from the more dovish wing of the LDP and from the city of Hiroshima that is especially sensitive to the risks of war, so he might be tempted to go a little more slowly than he would have with Abe’s prodding. On the other hand, the absence of Abe’s pressure may make it easier for him to push ahead faster in these areas, less burdened by the difficulty of overcoming progressive opposition to these changes because this segment of Japanese society was so suspicious of Abe and his nationalism.

If Kishida pursues a balanced and thoughtful program of security and economic reforms that makes sense to the Japanese people, he has the potential to step fairly quickly into the power vacuum left by Abe’s passing. If he does not, there are rival politicians within the LDP (e.g. Kono Taro, who served as Abe’s defense and foreign minister and is currently director of the LDP’s public affairs department) and new rival parties such as Nippon Ishin no Kai (the Japan Innovation Party) calling for change in many of these same areas. The competition will be to see which political force can rival Abe in his ability to operate the levers of political leadership.