India’s Strategic Autonomy: Can the US Convince New Delhi to Help it Contain China?

The planned Quad Leaders' Summit in Sydney on May 24 was derailed by the US debt ceiling crisis. It was a regrettable cancellation as the meeting was due to take place at a crucial time (the leaders did catch up in an abbreviated evening gathering on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, Japan).

More than a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was to be the first, top-level opportunity to take stock of how cohesive the still-evolving Quadrilateral Security Dialogue framework (bringing together Australia, India, Japan and the United States) is, as the previous leaders' summit only happened in Tokyo some three months after the start of the war. The war has been a dramatic event which has compelled many countries to pick a side. In this way, it has been helpful to get a sense of the geopolitical worldview and priorities of each country.

While the Quad was born as a non-traditional security minilateral framework – a more informal initiative than its multilateral counterparts – the rise of China has transformed the group into an alliance that can contain Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific, at least from Washington’s point of view. Australia, the US and Japan have stood in strategic lockstep over Russia, condemning Russian President Vladimir Putin and slapping heavy trade sanctions on his country.

India, however, has remained a wildcard, and its ambiguous messaging could present the US with its biggest challenge when it comes to the grouping. In this regard, India is an enigmatic weak link in the Quad, and its participation in the group was recently described by many observers as precarious. During the last year, India has stood out for its strategic autonomy regarding relations with Russia, especially on issues such as gas imports from Moscow.

Political cohesion is fundamental to the Quad – especially when it comes to China – because dealing with Beijing has been the underlying rationale of this framework. The Quad is one of several US-led minilateral and multilateral initiatives – others include the Build Back Better World, AUKUS, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the expansion of NATO’s field of interest to the Indo-Pacific – that the administration of US President Joe Biden has pursued with the aim of “updating” alliances in an evolving environment and after the divisive approach of his predecessor Donald Trump. 

Indeed, Biden's national security strategy and approach to the Indo-Pacific contrast with previous administrations in explicitly acknowledging that successful competition with China "cannot be accomplished alone" and "require[s] unprecedented cooperation with those who share in this vision". All this is part of a US effort at creating a liberal international order (LIO) 2.0 – a "more exclusive club than the LIO" with a "stricter layer of rules" to prevent China from eroding American power and influence.

This is why ensuring a commitment from all members of the alliance on traditional security issues – such as defense – as opposed to only non-traditional security issues – for example, supply chains and climate change – is critical. In the late 2000s, the Quad was set back because of Australia's strong economic relationship with China. But commercial tensions in recent years between Canberra and Beijing have pushed the former closer to Washington. Similarly, the war in Ukraine has increased Japan's already existing concerns about China's assertiveness in East Asia.